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Abstract. We estimate a mortgage default model with national data on conventional
mortgages that were current from 1986 to 1992. Our analysis conﬁrms the results of
previous analyses of Federal Housing Authority mortgages: Black households have higher
marginal default rates, controlling for differences in borrower and property
characteristics. Further, we do not ﬁnd that Black borrowers have signiﬁcantly more
home equity. These results do not provide evidence of racial discrimination in mortgage
lending and suggest that differences in default costs or transaction costs may explain
differences in default rates.
Introduction
This article presents evidence that Black borrowers have higher default rates on
conventional residential mortgages than other borrowers. Our results do not support
racial discrimination in mortgage lending, consistent with analyzes of Federal Housing
Authority (FHA) mortgages. Our conﬁrmation of previous ﬁndings is important
because of the prominence of the discrimination issue in public policy initiatives and
the questions surrounding previous studies of racial differences in mortgage default
rates. For decades public policy goals have included increasing minority access to
owner occupied housing by eliminating racial discrimination in mortgage lending.
Congress passed several laws aimed at eliminating discrimination (e.g., Fair Housing
Act (1968); Equal Credit Opportunity Act (1974); Community Reinvestment Act
(1977, amended 1989); Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (1975)). Various federal
agencies monitor lenders for compliance with lending laws and provide information
to the Department of Justice for prosecution. Evanoff and Segal (1997) provide a
detailed discussion of policy initiatives.
Recent studies provide not only conﬂicting evidence of the existence of racial
discrimination but also fundamental disagreements on what constitutes evidence of
discrimination. Munnel, Browne, McEneaney and Tootell (MBMT) (1996) analyze
mortgage application data collected for a study by the Federal Reserve Bank in
Boston. They ﬁnd lower mortgage loan approval rates for minority borrowers and
conclude that racial discrimination exists. Horne (1997) analyzes a subset of the
Boston Fed data and concludes that there is no difference in approval rates among
racial groups. Critics of the MBMT approach argue that the lower minority borrower
loan approval rates may be the result of higher credit risks and that evidence of
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discrimination1 is manifest in differences in mortgage default rates2 and mortgage
loan proﬁtability. Using data on FHA mortgages, Berkovec, Canner, Gabriel and
Hannan (BCGH) (1994a, b) estimate a default probability model that accounts for
characteristics of the property, the neighborhood and the borrowers, including race.
Their analysis indicates that minority borrower default rates are higher and minority
borrower loans are less proﬁtable, results not suggestive of racial discrimination in
the FHA mortgage market.
Both the interpretation and the reliability of the BCGH studies are questioned.
Brueckner (1995) and Ferguson and Peters (1995) demonstrate that taken together
lower minority borrower default rates and lower minority borrower approval rates
indicate discrimination, but that higher minority borrower default rates cannot be
interpreted as evidence of the absence of discrimination. Higher minority default rates
may result from lower default costs, regardless of whether lenders discriminate or not.
Questions about the reliability of the BCGH default rate estimates stem from three
sources of bias: (1) omitted variables due to the absence of variables identiﬁed in
theoretical default models; (2) simultaneous equations due to the correlation between
equity and (unmeasurable) components of default costs; and (3) measurement errors
due to the use of variables measured at the time of loan origination instead of at the
time of default.3
Our study extends knowledge on default rates in two important ways. First, we analyze
conventional mortgage defaults. Some researchers4 assume that discrimination in the
conventional mortgage markets forces minority borrowers into the government
mortgage market although conventional mortgage default rates by racial groups have
not been analyzed.5 Second, we estimate a default rate model with procedures and
data to correct the above biases. The model derives from theories of the optimal
exercise of the default option to lessen omitted variable bias. In addition, this model
is estimated with an instrument for equity to correct simultaneity bias and with data
values contemporaneous to the default decision, not loan origination, to lessen
measurement error bias.
Our default probability model indicates that the marginal default rate for Black
households6 is signiﬁcantly higher and the difference in default rates is not reduced
when controlling for equity, borrower age, borrower education and the number of
dependents. Further analysis of house equity does not suggest mortgages issued to
minority borrowers are more proﬁtable. These results do not provide evidence of racial
discrimination in the conventional mortgage market.
The Empirical Model
Default occurs when a borrower maximizes wealth by choosing the option to cease
mortgage payments and ultimately relinquish the property to the lender. Defaults result
from decisions by both lenders and borrowers. Lenders approve mortgage applications
based on a credit index, an estimate of borrower default costs. If a borrower becomes
delinquent in payments, lenders choose to either foreclose on the property or
restructure a loan according to the likelihood that a new mortgage contract would beMORTGAGE DEFAULT RATES AND BORROWER RACE 281
proﬁtable. Borrowers experience unpredictable changes in personal and ﬁnancial
conditions that may dictate relinquishing the property to the lender if its value is less
than the mortgage value. The mortgage value is equity, house value less mortgage
balance, and the value of prepayment and default options7 (OV) imbedded in the
mortgage contract. Negative mortgage values motivate ﬁnancial defaults; changes in
personal, ﬁnancial or occupational circumstances that impel households to relocate
motivate nonﬁnancial defaults. With no costs to default, negative mortgage value
would prompt default. However, default imposes personal costs on borrowers that
include limits on occupational and credit opportunities, social stigma and damage to
reputation (see Kau, Keenan and Kim, 1993; and Vandell and Thibodeau, 1985). If
these costs exceed the absolute value of negative equity, the borrower will not default.
We denote these personal costs as default costs (DC). Default also depends on
transaction costs (TC) such as payments related to selling the property and relocation,
discounts of the selling price from (expected) house value due to market conditions
or property liquidation time constraints and the negative cost of free rent during the
foreclosure process (Gilberto and Houston, 1989). The borrower must subtract these
costs from equity in order to decide if selling the property and moving is preferable
to relinquishing the deed to the lender. Default will occur if:
DC 1 EQUITY 1 OV 2 TC , 0. (1)
Although lenders cannot determine borrower default costs because they are partly
subjective and thus vary for individuals who may have similar ﬁnancial and personal
circumstances, lenders reduce default risk by approving mortgages only to borrowers
judged to have sufﬁciently high default costs as measure by a credit index (CI):
DC 5 CI 1 z, (2)
where z is a disturbance term that represents unobservable borrower information. The
CI is:
CI 5 bX* 1 cB. (3)
where X* is a vector of property and borrower characteristics and B is a binary
variable equal to one for minority borrowers. The parameter c measures differential
default costs appraisals due to race related factors.8
Lenders approve mortgages only when estimated default costs exceed their limit, Q.
Lenders may discriminate by setting a higher cost limit for minority borrowers,
represented by the parameter d*. Loan approval requires:
CI 5 bX* 1 cB . Q 1 d*B. (4)
Minority borrowers will have lower loan approval rates if either lenders discriminate
(d* . 0) or judge minorities to have lower default costs (c , 0). Lenders discriminate
by requiring minority borrowers have higher (expected) default costs, measured by
bX*. This discrimination results in lower expected default probabilities and higher282 JOURNAL OF REAL ESTATE RESEARCH
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expected loan proﬁtability. If lenders judge the average credit index to be lower for
minority borrowers (c , 0), both discriminating and nondiscriminating lenders
(d 5 0) require minority borrowers have higher (expected) default costs. However,
in this case (c , 0), the loans to minority borrowers will not be more proﬁtable
because predicted total default costs will equal Q for all borrowers. This reasoning
leads some (see Becker, 1993; and Ferguson and Peters, 1995) to conclude that
evidence of racial discrimination derives from the analysis of loan proﬁtability.
Equation (4) allows illustration of the econometric issues related to the analysis of
discrimination with default equation estimates. Because we do not have data on
applicants who scored below Q 1 d*B, sample selection bias is possible. However,
a recent simulation (Ross, 1996) suggests bias from this source is not problematic.
Also, if our model contained all the information used in constructing the credit index,
X*, we would estimate no signiﬁcance difference in the race binary variable
coefﬁcient due to discrimination. Black borrowers have larger values of X* but the
effect on default probability is measured by the parameter b for all borrowers. If we
do not have the complete set of variables in X*, then the model estimates may
inappropriately indicate discrimination. Let X* include variables in our model, X, and
variables unobservable by researchers (but not the lender), Xu: X* 5 X 1 Xu. Then
the credit index for approved loans can be written:
CI 5 bX 1 b9X 1 (c 1 d)B, (5) uu
where d 5 bu(Xu for Black borrowers 2 Xu for other borrowers). Since discrimination
requires Black borrowers to have higher credit index values for loan approval,
d . 0.9
The decision to default depends on borrowers’ appraisals of the transaction costs
incurred when vacating the property. For planned changes in residence, say due to a
new employment opportunity or purchase of a larger house, these costs are likely
relatively low and the borrower sells the property and repays the mortgage balance.
These transaction costs are likely higher for unplanned relocation resulting from
‘‘trigger events,’’ such as unexpected changes in ﬁnancial and personal circumstances,
including job termination, layoffs and divorce. When a trigger event occurs, the
borrower may abandon the property to the lender. We represent these transaction
costs10 as:
TC 5 zX 1 tB 1 g, (6)
where g measures unobservable costs. Recall that the vector X contains borrower
characteristics that may affect transaction costs and trigger events, such as income,
number of dependents, education level and age. The parameter t measures differences
in these costs for minority borrowers.
Substitution of Equations 3–7 into Equation 1 yields the following expression for the
probability that a mortgage will default (D):MORTGAGE DEFAULT RATES AND BORROWER RACE 283
D 5 prob((b 2 x)X 1 (c 1 d 2 t)B 1 z 2 g 1 EQUITY 1 OV , 0). (7)
The default decision is represented as a linear model:
y* 5 bX 1 b B 1 « (8) t,jt ,jb j t ,j
where bb 5 c 1 d 2 t. The individual defaults at time t if y is less than a critical * t,j
value, c. We observe the binary variable y deﬁned by:
y 5 0i f y* . c. t,j t,j (9)
y 5 1i f y* , c. t,jt , j
Equations (8) and (9) indicate:
Prob(y 5 1) 5 prob(bX 1 b B 1 « , c). (10) t,jt ,jb jt ,j
We estimate the parameters b and bb with a probit model.11 The regressors, Xt,j,
include a constant term and the following variables:
BLACKj 5 1i ft h ejth borrower is Black; 5 0 otherwise;
INCOMEt,j 5 Income of borrower j and time t;
AGEj 5 Age of the borrower at loan origination;
DEPENDENTSj 5 Number of dependents at loan origination;
EDUCATIONj 5 Years of schooling at time of loan origination;
EQUITYt,j 5 House value 2 mortgage market value;
VARPRICEt,j 5 Standard deviation of house price changes; and
STATEj 5 1 if the property is in Florida, Texas or Oklahoma; 5 0 otherwise.
BLACK identiﬁes default rate probability differences stemming from discrimination
or costs differentials. If Black borrowers do not have different average transaction
costs or default costs (c 5 t 5 0), racial discrimination (d . 0) reduces the probability
of default, bb , 0, because discrimination requires higher credit index for loan
approval. If Black borrowers have lower default costs (c , 0) or higher transaction
costs associated with trigger events (t . 0), Black borrower default rates could be
higher, even with racial or economic discrimination, holding constant other factors
expected to inﬂuence default rates.
Models of default predict that EQUITY is inversely related to default probability;
higher equity makes default less likely. Brueckner (1994a) illustrates that equity may
be endogenous in default probability models. Borrowers with higher default costs will
choose lower loan-to-value loans and have higher levels of equity. Because default
costs are subjective, variables included in the model to measured default costs will
do so with error, thus equity and the regression disturbance term are correlated. Yezer,
Phillips and Trost (1994) demonstrate that this simultaneity problem is likely to bias
the coefﬁcient on the race variable upwards, masking the effects of discrimination of284 JOURNAL OF REAL ESTATE RESEARCH
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default probability. To correct for this bias, the default probit model is estimated with
an instrumental variable for EQUITY.
The variability of house prices is directly related to the value of the default option
imbedded in the mortgage contract. Because increases in VARPRICE raise the value
of the mortgage, borrowers are less likely to default. STATE is included to measure
locations (Florida, Texas and Oklahoma) which likely experienced real estate price
declines and higher selling costs due to market weakness.
Individual characteristics measure differences in borrower default and transaction
costs. Because default costs include restrictions on employment and credit
opportunities, borrowers with more human capital, measured by INCOME,
EDUCATION and AGE, have higher default costs and thus lower default probabilities.
More DEPENDENTS increase claims on income and increases the likelihood a trigger
event will force relocation and default.12
The Data
The data is primarily constructed from the conventional mortgage origination records
and the conventional mortgage servicing records of a large New Jersey-based Savings
and Loan that originated loans nationally.13 The origination data includes
characteristics of the borrower and the property, the purchase price, the metropolitan
location of the property and characteristics of the mortgage. The loan servicing data
includes the mortgage termination information and the monthly payment history. The
sample includes conventional FRMs that originated from 1985 to 1988 and terminated
or were censored between 1986 and June 1992.14 Censored loans include loans current
at the end of the sample period and loans that were dropped from servicing records
prior to termination primarily due to the sale of the servicing contracts. The default
date records when payments were stopped, not when loans were foreclosed.15 For the
analysis, annual observations of the loan status are used and equity and the variability
of house appreciation rates are calculated each year.16
Values of the variables AGE, DEPENDENTS, EDUCATION and BLACK are as
reported on the loan application. Equity17 is:
EQUITY 5 HOUSE VALUE 2 MORTGAGE BALANCE . (10) t,jt ,jt ,j
The property is assumed to appreciate at the metropolitan average rate:
HOUSE VALUE 5 Purchase Price* MHP /MHP , (11) t,jj t ,i 0,i
Where MHPt,i is the value of the house price index for the ith Metropolitan Statistical
Area (MSA) during year t, and MHP0,i is the value of the index at the time the loan
was originated.18 The instrumental variable for EQUITY is calculated with the
predicted mortgage balance, which is calculated as the predicted initial loan amount
adjusted each time period for payments to principal made prior to time t.19 VARPRICEMORTGAGE DEFAULT RATES AND BORROWER RACE 285
Exhibit 1
Means and Standard Deviations













Proportion with negative equity 0.165 0.159 0.30












































Observations 1,670 1,593 77
is the standard deviation of a ﬁve-year moving average of the MSA house price
appreciation rate and measures the value of the default option.
The sample means, reported in Exhibit 1, illustrate Black borrowers have substantially
higher default rates (.065 vs. .009). The data suggest several reasons for these higher
default rates that are unrelated to race. Blacks borrowers have about one-third less
EQUITY and 30% of Black household have negative EQUITY, while only 16% of
other households have negative EQUITY. Also, Black households in this sample are
more likely to live in the three Southern states (Texas, Oklahoma and Florida), which
experienced lower house price appreciation and higher default rates during the sample
period. Also, Black borrowers may have lower default costs, as evidenced by 40%
less INCOME.
Default Model Estimates
Exhibit 2 reports estimates of two discrete time models. The ﬁrst model contains a
single explanatory variable, BLACK. The model indicates Black borrowers have
statistically signiﬁcant higher default rates. The second model includes the measures286 JOURNAL OF REAL ESTATE RESEARCH














































Note: t-Statistics are in parenthesis.
*Statistically signiﬁcant at the 1% level.
of the default option and borrower characteristics that may affect default and
transaction costs. The estimates indicate that lower levels of EQUITY increase default
probability. Properties located in the three states have higher default rates, although
not signiﬁcantly higher. Younger borrowers and borrowers with more dependents have
higher default probabilities. Also, Black borrowers are estimated to have higher default
probabilities. The magnitude of the coefﬁcient suggests the additional variables do
not reduce substantially the magnitude of the racial differential in default probability.20
The result that Black borrower default rates are higher is not itself evidence of the
absence of racial discrimination because lower default costs or higher transaction costs
can offset the effect of discrimination on default rates. To investigate the reason for
differential default rates among borrowers, we regress EQUITY21 on BLACK and other
borrower characteristics. We expect to ﬁnd a positive effect of BLACK on EQUITY if
there is discrimination by the lender; recall discrimination results in both lower defalt
rates and higher loan proﬁtability, hence higher EQUITY for Black borrowers.22 We
expect to ﬁnd a negative effect of BLACK on EQUITY if Black borrowers have lower
default costs.MORTGAGE DEFAULT RATES AND BORROWER RACE 287
The estimate of the EQUITY model is reported in Exhibit 2. Older, more highly
educated and higher income borrowers have higher equity levels. These results
combined with the estimated lower default rates are consistent with either lender
discrimination or higher default costs for these groups, but are clearly due to higher
default costs. BLACK borrowers are estimated to have lower levels of EQUITY
although the difference is not statistically signiﬁcant. These results combined with the
higher default probabilities are not suggestive of discrimination and may derive from
lower default costs or higher levels of transaction costs associated with trigger events
that require unanticipated and, perhaps, unwanted changes in residential location. We
recognize that our measure of EQUITY is weak because it is calculated with
metropolitan area house price appreciation rates and this weakness reduces the power
of our analysis. However, the analysis is useful because it provides information on
discrimination previously lacking in the literature and direction for further research.
Conclusion
Our analysis of conventional mortgage data conﬁrms the results of previous analyses
of FHA mortgages: Black households have higher marginal default rates. Further we
ﬁnd no evidence of higher proﬁtability on loans to Black borrowers but ﬁnd evidence
of lower equity for Black borrowers. These results are not consistent with racial
discrimination in mortgage lending. We conclude further research on costs associated
with default and with trigger events is needed to understand why minority borrowers
have higher default rates.
Endnotes
1 Discrimination refers to ‘‘uneconomical discrimination’’: discrimination that causes expected
proﬁtability of loans made to one group to exceed that of loans made to other groups. This
usage does not include economic discrimination, which lenders use to distinguish between good
and bad risks. See Peterson (1981) and Becker (1993).
2 We use default to indicate the property is claimed by the lender, not the technical deﬁnition
that a mortgage is delinquent in payments.
3 These econometric critiques are made by several researchers. For examples, see Brueckner
(1994a, b), Cappozza (1994), Ross (1994, 1998) and Yezer, Phillips and Trost (1994) and other
articles in the special issues of Cityscape (February, 1994) and the Journal of Real Estate
Finance and Economics (November, 1994) devoted to discrimination in real estate ﬁnance.
4 See BCGH (1994a, b) and Brueckner (1994a).
5 Several studies of default rates on conventional mortgages have been published but these do
not include the borrower race in the model (see Phillips, Rosenblatt and VanderHoff, 1995).
6 We analyze Black default because preliminary analysis indicated that other minority borrowers
had a small percentage of loans and did not default at a rate statistically different from White
borrowers. Also, the literature has predominately focused on Black default rates. See the articles
in Cityscape (February, 1994) and the Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics
(November, 1994).
7 The value of options depends on interest rates, the variability of house prices and interest rates
(see Kau, Keenan and Kim, 1993).288 JOURNAL OF REAL ESTATE RESEARCH
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8 For example, racial discrimination in employment markets could lessen default costs associated
with restrictions on employment opportunities.
9 When the omitted variables are correlated with race, the coefﬁcient on the race variable will
be biased towards zero, indicating no racial difference in default rates.
10 The rent free occupancy of the house during the foreclosure proceeding is included as a
negative transaction cost.
11 The standard errors are biased in the linear model due to heteroskedasticity and predicted
value of the default probability may lie outside the (0,1) interval problems (see Greene, 1993).
12 BCGH (1994a, b) discuss the effect of dependents on default probability.
13 The origination data is more fully described in Phillips and VanderHoff (1994) and the
payments data is more fully described in Phillips, Rosenblatt and VanderHoff (1995). A
relatively small number of loans, about 1100, were in both data sets and include data on
borrower characteristics. These data include loans from twenty states.
14 The data set also included information on adjustable rate mortgages (ARMs) but these loan
are not included in the analysis. The FRM and ARM default models are signiﬁcantly different
and the ARM model did not identify borrower race as a factor affecting default probability.
This result may stem form the low number of minority borrowers who choose the ARM.
15 Loans are classiﬁed as a default if payments and loan balances are not paid. A loan in which
payments were continued after a period of nonpayment would not be classiﬁed as a default.
16 This use of annual observations to analyze the probability of default is an application of
discrete time methods, as discussed by Allison (1982).
17 Because EQUITY is measured when payments were stopped not when the deed to the property
was transferred, its estimated coefﬁcient provides insights into the reasons for initiating the
process that leads to default not the conditions that exist at loan origination or the end of the
foreclosure process.
18 This index created by Haurin, Hendershott and Kim (1991) combines house price data from
the American Chamber of Commerce, Coldwell Banker and the National Association of
Realtors.
19 We estimate LTV as a function of borrower characteristics. This estimate and house price
provide an estimate of initial loan amount.
20 The probit model estimates do not indicate the magnitude of the effect of a variable on the
probability. Analysis of the linear model indicates that the additional variables reduce the
estimated effect of BLACK on default probability by 12%.
21 We use actual values of EQUITY, not the predicted value used in the default model.
22 We recognize that loan proﬁtability depends not only on equity but on the recovery rate on
the equity and on collection costs. However, our data does not include measures of the factors
required to make a more exact measure of proﬁtability.
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